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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF 
CLAUDIUS WALLICH, 
deceased, 
FRED R. W ALLI CH 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
A. C. vV ALLI CH, et al 
Cross-Petitioner and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
10569 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
FACTS 
On Feb. 5, 1959 Walker Bank and Trust Com-
pany, the Executor of the Last Will and Testa-
ment of Claudius Wallich, deceased, filed its peti-
tion for settlement of its first and final account 
and for distribution. 
Said petition with respect to the residue of 
said estate in paragraph ( q) R 29 provided: 
"To Fred R. Wallich, all of the rest, 
residue and remainder ... to be held and used 
by him in his discretion in accordance with 
and pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 
8 of the will of the deceased." 
1 
On Feb. 18, 1959, the appellant, Fred R. Wal-
lich, stipulated with A. C. Wallich, one of the re-
spondents herein. 
"E. Ordering that all the rest, residue 
and remainder of the property now on hand 
for distribution as is in said petition set 
forth to be distributed and delivered to Freel 
R. "\Vallich as set forth in said petition." 
R 50 
On Feb. 24, 1959, the residue of said estate 
was distributed, said order in part providing: 
"And the same is hereby distributed to 
Fred R. W allich, to be held and used by him 
in his discretion in accordance with and pur-
suant to the provisions of paragraph 8 of 
the will of the deceased." R 62 
The reason for the stipulation was that Fred 
R. Wallich and A. C. Wallich contested an issue 
involving paragraph 7 of the same will. However, 
Fred R. Wallich did not contest the issue of distri-
bution in accordance with and pursuant to the pro-
visions of paragraph 8 of said will, nor did he re-
quest construction of the will with respect to said 
paragraph 8. 
On May 9, 1960 Fred R. Wallich signed and 
filed with the court two written instruments which 
were signed and sworn to by him under oath. One 
was designated a receipt and undertaking and the 
other a receipt of distribution. 
2 
The first one R 199 was as follows: 
"I, Fred R. Wallich, do hereby acknowl-
edge from Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
Executor under the Last Will and Testament 
of Claudius Wallich, deceased, receipt of: 
'Three Thousand ( 3,000) shares Crown Zel-
lerbach Corporation, Nevada, $5 par common. 
Ctfs. NY 133627 /NY133656 n/o Fred R. 
Wallich, Trustee u/w Claudius Wallich, de-
ceased·' 
' 
under the provisions of the Order of the above 
entitled Court made and entered on the 24th 
day of February, 1959, to have, hold, admin-
ister, and dispose of the same as Testamen-
tary Trustee and pursuant to the provisions 
of paragraph eight of the Last \Vill and Tes-
tament of said Claudius Wallich, deceased." 
The second one R 201 
"I, Fred R. W allich, do hereby acknowl-
edge from Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
Executor under the Last Will & Testament 
of Claudius Wallich, deceased, receipt of: 
'Three Thousand ( 3, 000) sh. Crown Zeller-
bach Corporation, Nevada, $5 par common. 
Cts. NY133627 /NY133656 n/o Fred R. Wal-
lich, Trustee 1-l/w Claudius vVallich, deceased;' 
to have, hold, administer and dispose of the 
same as pursuant to the provisions of para-
graph eight of the Last Will & Testament of 
said Claudius Wallich, deceased." 
R 201 Emphasis above are supplied to demon-
strate that appellant erroneously represented to 
this Court in his brief that the second receipt did 
not contain the word "trustee." It is to be noted 
3 
that it did, and that Fred R. W allich under oath 
represented that he was trustee under the will of 
Claudius Wallich, deceased, in receiving said pro-
perty. 
R 158 Fred R. Wallich in his duly verified 
petition represented to the Court that pursuant to 
the Court order he received 3,000 shares of Crown 
Zellerbach stock evidenced by certificates issued in 
the name of "Fred R. W allich, Trustee u/w of 
Claudius Wallich, deceased," and that he had taken 
the same to the State of California where he re-
sides and, 
"It is wholly impossible for him to nego-
tiate, sell, or otherwise dispose of the stock, 
thus preventing him from making use of the 
stock for the purposes intended by the will 
of the deceased." 
The Court, without notice of any hearing 
thereon, entered its order making a finding that 
the stock certificates should be re-issued in the 
name of Fred R. Wallich, trustee, without refer-
ence to the will of the deceased, for the purpose of 
permitting the same to be negotiated by Fred R. 
W allich so he could carry out the purposes of the 
will. R 161 
After the expiration of 5 years after the death 
of testator, the time fixed when R. Wallich under 
said will was required to distribute the residue of 
said trust fund, A. C. Wallich made demand upon 
4 
said Fred R. W allich to make such distribution. Upon 
his ref us al, A. C. W allich commenced an action 
against Fred W allich in the Superior Court of Calif-
ornia, for the County of Los Angeles to compel Fred 
\Vallich to account for and distribute the trust 
estate in accordance with paragraph 8 of said will. 
After the filing of said action against him in 
California, Fred R. W allich did thereafter file his 
Petition for Discharge as a Testamentary Trustee 
before the lower Court in Utah, and the order made 
thereon requiring him to account and distribute is 
the basis of this appeal to this Court. The Superior 
Court of California determined as fallows: 
"If the Utah proceedings are conducted 
in good faith and with due diligence, then that 
Court may appropriately be recognized by 
the California Courts as having primary jur-
isdiction." 
This order was made despite the fact that the peti-
tion in Utah was filed only after respondents had 
pursued their remedy against Fred R. W allich in 
California. See R 292 for the California Memoran-
dum Opinion. 
On Aug. 20, 1964, Fred R. Wallich did file his 
said petition for Discharge of Testamentary Trus-
tee in the District Court R 226 wherein he did pray, 
"E That petitioner be discharged as testamen-
tary trustee pursuant to Section 75-12-32 
U. C. A." 
In the same petition wherein said Fred R. Wallich 
5 
t h . asserl,s e is a testamentary trustee, he also asserts 
that he is not a testamentary trustee and that all 
the property he received was an outright gift to him. 
The Court found Fred R. W allich was a testa-
mentary trustee, and ordered him to account and 
distribute. R. 312 It is this order appellant appeals 
from. 
All the above involved the issues now before 
this Court. On a prior case before this Court, A. C. 
vVallich, one of the respondents, and Fred Wallich 
appellant, were before this Court on a case involv-
ing paragraph 7 of this same will. 
In another issue the trial involving paragraph 
7 of this same will, Fred R. W allich did represent 
to the District Court in a brief filed, that he was 
the testamentary trustee under paragraph 8 of said 
will, and that he could be called upon to make con-
tributions to the beneficiaries named under said 
paragraph 8 of said will to meet emergencies. 
Said bri~f is contained in the packet marked 
R 357 and on Page 4 of said brief is contained the 
following direct quote, which is word for word as 
counsel for Fred R. Wallich represented it to the 
Court. The part in parenthesis is a direct quote from 
Paragraph 8 of the will now being considered, and 
was suplied by Fred R. Wallich to the court: 
"Therefore, inasmuch as the decedent was 
leaving the residue in trust with Fred R. 
W allich (to meet any emergencies that may 
6 
arise in, and for the use and benefit of the 
Wallich family, that is, my blood relations 
regardless of their degree of kindred or re~ 
lationship to me.) Fred R. Wallich would be 
most likely called upon to make further con-
tributions for the support of Minnie after the 
exhausting of the $10,000.00." R 357 
See also R 95 where under sworn testimony 
Fred R. W allich asserted and his counsel stated 
that "there is $150,000.00 in that residuary trust." 
This is the very trust that they now deny existed. 
A. C. W allich prevailed in said case and Fred 
R. W allich appealed the order to the Supreme Court, 
Case No. 9144, a photostat of the first page of said 
brief is attached to the first cover page of this brief, 
showing Fred R. W allich a second time represented 
to the Supreme Court that he was "trustee of the 
residuary estated under the will of Claudius Wal-
lich, deceased." Said case is reported at 350 P 2d 
614, 10 u 2d 192. 
On page 6 of appellants brief he refers to an 
ex parte order R 217. This is not an order within 
the pleadings or issues before this Court. Said ex 
parte order entered without notice involved a fund 
held by the executor as a stakeholder involving the 
issue of who was entitled to such fund under para-
graph 7 of said will. 
The issue before this Court involves the order 
R 62, concerning whether paragraph 8 of the will 
is incorporated in said order, and other facts as 
herein later related. 
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Fred R. "\V allich now petitions the court to dis-
charge him as a testamentary trustee pursuant to 
Sec. 75-12-32 U.C.A., and in the very same petition 
alleges that he is not a trustee and that all the resi-
due of the estate was an outright gift to him per-
sonally. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
A DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION WHICH DISTRI-
BUTED "IN PURSUANCE OF AND ACCORDING TO 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAST WILL OF SAID 
DECEDENT" INCORPORATED THE WILL INTO THE 
DECREE. 
The above point is taken word for word from 
No. 5 in the Lockhart case hereinafter cited. 
On Feb. 24, 1959, the residue of said estate was 
distributed, said order in part providing: 
" ... And the same is hereby distributed to 
Fred R. W allich, to be held and used by him 
in his discretion in accordance with and pur-
suant to the provisions of Paragraph 8 of 
the Will of the deceased." R 62 
Without exception, the cases all hold that on 
phrases wherein the Court distributes property "in 
accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of 
a will," that the decree incorporates said provisions 
of said will in said decree as fully as though copied 
into said decree word for word. 
Appellant cites the case of Miller vs. Walker, 
404 P 2d 675. This case is not in point for the reason 
8 
that in the Walker case the court distributed all of 
the property to the widow and did not state in said 
decree "to be held and used by her in accordance 
with and pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 
________ of said Will." 
A review of the cases demonstrates that Para-
g1·aph 8 was incorporated in said decree as fully 
as though it was set forth therein word for word. 
The part of the opinion in the Lockhart case quoted 
below which is set forth in caps is so set forth be-
cause it is italicized in the written opinion by the 
Court. The emphasis is not added by respondent. 
The obvious purpose of the emphasis is to clearly 
demonstrate that by the use of precisely the same 
phrase the courts hold that the will is incorporated 
in to the decree. 
HENRY LOCKHART vs. CRAIL 
69 P 2d 1001 Cal. 
''IN PURSUANCE OF AND ACCORDING 
TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAST 
WILL OF SAID DECEASED." 
''The court may, by express terms or by apt 
reference thereto, incorporate the will in the 
decree so as to cons ti tu te it a portion of its 
distributive terms and make it a part of the 
decree as effectually as though set forth in 
it. When necessity arises thereafter to con-
strue the decree, it is the duty of the court 
to look to the will to ascertain the terms of dis-
tribution. Horton v. Winbigler, 175 Cal. 149, 
165 P. 423. If the will, by apt reference, is 
made part of the decree, it supplies matters 
9 
which it contains but the decree omits. In re 
Estate of Blake, 157 Cal. 448, 108 P. 287. 
While the will cannot be used to impeach the 
decree, it can be used to explain it where the 
decree taken alone is uncertain, vague, and 
ambiguous. This rule has been applied both 
where the decree ref erred to the will (in re 
Ewer's Will, 177 Cal. 660, 171 P. 683; Fraser 
v. Carman-Ryles (Cal. Sup.) 64 P. 2d 397), 
and where it did not. McCloud v. Hewlett, 
135 Cal. 361, 67 P. 333. The decree does not 
appear to be uncertain or ambiguous in re-
spect to each child's ultimate share, for it 
clearly provides that each child shall receive 
as a conditional legacy, one-sixth of the prin-
cipal of the trust estate, and as a residuary 
legacy one-third of the property then in trust, 
at the termination of the trust. But the decree 
does omit the provision of the will that each 
child was to receive ultimately one-third of the 
entire trust estate.Phrases identically word-
ed to the above-italidzed portion of the pre-
sent decree have been held to incorporate the 
will into the decree. Horton v. Winbigler, 
supra; In re Ewer's Will, supra. The will, 
therefore, was properly admitted, and the 
judgment in so far as it distributed one-third 
of the entire estate to the assignees is cor-
rect.'' 
In the above-captioned case, the court points 
out that the decree did not state specifically that 
each child was ultimately to receive the entire trust 
estate. In the case at bar, the decree does not state 
that the heirs of the Wallich family are to have 
distributed to them by right of representation, all 
10 
of the residue remaining. However, the will so re-
cites, and being incorporated into the decree it is 
not contradicting the decree but merely in aid of it 
as the rationale of the cases indicate must be done. 
SHATTUCK ~. SHATTUCK 
192 P 2d 229 Ariz. 
"2 It is generally held also that a will may 
not be used to impeach a decree of final dis-
tribution, but may be used only in aid of it. 
Keating v. Smith, 154 Cal. 186, 97 P. 300; In 
re Gardiner's Estate, supra; In re Easter's 
Estate, supra; Tacoma Savings & Loan Ass'n 
v. Nadham, 14 Wash. 2d 576, 128 P. 2d 982 
" 
"3 An apt reference to the terms of the will, 
as was made in the instant case, has the ef-
fect of incorporating the will into the decree 
and of merging the one into the other as fully 
as though copied into it verbatim. Goad v. 
Montgomery, 119 Cal. 552, 51 P. 681, 63 Am. 
St. Rep. 145; Greenwood v. Murray, 26 Minn. 
259, 2 N.W. 945." Emphasis supplied. 
CLARK vs. CAPITAL NAT. BANK 
206 p 2d 16 
'''It is ordinarily true that a final decree of 
distribution of property is final and conclu-
sive upon the heirs, devisees and legatees, and 
that the terms of the will may not be used to 
impeach the clear and unambiguous terms of 
the decree of distribution. But certainly when 
the decree specifically refers to the will, as it 
does in the present case, it may be used to 
11 
clarify and explain the distributive terms of 
the decree ... " 
" '* * * But while the will cannot be used 
to impeach the decree, it can be used to ex-
plain it where the decree taken alone is un-
certain, vague, or ambiguous.' ... " 
"If the will, by apt reference, is made part 
of the decree, it supplies matters which it 
contains but the decree omits ... " 
"The decree actually distributed the fund to 
the named trustee, to be administered 'in 
accordance and subject to the terms of para-
graph Ninth of the Will of said deceased, 
to which reference is hereby made.' (Italics 
added.)" 
POINT II. 
WHERE A DECREE WHICH HAS INCORPORAT-
ED A PART OF A WILL THEREIN HAS BECOME 
FINAL ONE GIVING A RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY AS 
A TRUSTEE MAY NOT REOPEN SAID DECREE TO 
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION THEREOF AS A PERSONAL 
GIFT OF SAID PROPERTY TO HIM. 
Said Decree of Distribution was made and en-
tered Sept. 24, 1959. No appeal was taken there-
from and as made and provided under 75-1-7; 75-
1-8; 75-11-37; 75-14-12 U.C.A. 1953 said probate 
decree was final and conclusive, particularly where 
appellant stipulated to the entry of said decree and 
received the residue under his sworn statement as 
a trustee. 
The cases also hold he may not reopen said de-
cree. 
12 
Miller vs. Walker Bank & Trust Company 
404 p 2d 675 17 u 2d 88 
~'The probate of the estate was a proceeding 
m rem ~nd the decree. after the time for ap-
peal expired became fmal and conclusive and 
is not subject to attack, except for fraud. 
See also in re: Rice Estate 182 P 2d 111 -
111 U 428, and in re: Latsis estate 284 P 2d 
4 79 ________ u ________ , 
POINT III. 
THE CARDINAL RULE FOR INTERPRETATION 
OF WILLS IS TO LOOK TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
WILL TO DETERMINE THE PURPOSE AND INTENT 
OF THE TESTATOR. 
This point is a direct quote from W allich vs. 
W allich, 350 P 2d 614 where this Court considered 
Paragraph 7 of this same will. 
Even though said decree is final and may not 
be re-opened for construction, nevertheless, if it were 
to be construed, the lower court should be affirmed. 
An analysis of Paragraph 8 now before this court 
is best demonstrated by taking a paragraph at a 
time with emphasis supplied as fallows: 
". . . I hereby give, devise and bequeath to 
my said nephew, Fred R. W allich, son of my 
deceased brother, Julius C. Wallich, in trust, 
nevertheless, to be held and used by him in his 
sole and absolute discretion and without re-
striction or control of any kind whatsoever, 
" 
The cases hold that the use of the word "trust 
13 
compels a separation of legal estate and beneficial 
enjoyments. 
See Sand vs. Church of Assension 30 A 2d 771: 
"A trust cannot exist where the same person 
possesses both legal estate and beneficial en-
joyment since there must be a separation of 
legal estate from beneficial enjoyment in order 
to create a trust." 
Also King vs. Richardson 136 F 2d 849: 
"A trust arises when property is given to one 
with direction that it be used and applied for 
the benefit of another." 
Pratt vs. Board of Education 63 NE 2d 275: 
"A trust is in the nature of a deposition by 
which a proprietor tr an sf ers to another the 
property of the subject entrusted not that it 
should remain with him, but that it should 
be applied for the benefit of a third person. 
A trust is an obligation arising out of con-
fidence reposed in a person for another's 
benefit, to apply property faithfully and ac-
cording to such confidence." 
Consolves vs. H odgsen 237 P 2d 656: 
"There is always a dividend ownership of 
property to which trustee has legal title and 
cestui an equitable title." 
The nomenclature used in legal drafting of trust 
instruments by skilled draftsmen is generally the 
same as contained in the portion above quoted, to-
wit: 
"In trust nevertheless to be held and used by 
him." 
14 
It is also significant that the will provides it 
is to be held and used. Also, "in his sole discretion" 
signifies that he has legal title to the trust estate 
for the use and benefit of the beneficiaries, and the 
words further signify a trust relationship. The law 
defines "discretion" as follows: 
Menit vs. Kinini 157 P 2d 989: 
"Discretion does not mean power of free 
decision or right to pursue an undirected 
course. The discretion is one regulated by 
well known and established principles of law 
and equity." 
Stallard vs. Johnson 116 P 2d 965: 
"Not arbitrary which will permit the trustee 
to defeat the purposes of said trust under 
guise of its exercise." 
In re: Wilkin 75 NE 1105: 
"Discretion vested in the trustee never ex-
cuses bad faith.'' 
Moreover, since the word "trust" signifies a 
separation of legal title and beneficial use, the posi-
tion of Fred R. W allich in aserting that he is the 
sole owner is repugnant and inconsistent to the use 
of the word, "trust." 
The intention of the testator in the use to which 
said trust fund was to be put for a 5-year period 
is further shown in said paragraph 8 of said will 
as follows: 
". . . as a reserve to meet any emergencies 
that may arise in, and for the use and bene-
15 
fit of, the vVallich family, that is, my blood 
relations, regardless of their degree of kin-
dred or relationship to me:" 
Again, the choicest nomenclature used by 
draftsmen in preparation of trusts is the use of 
the phrase, "use and benefit of" and it is impos-
sible for testator to more clearly express his intention 
to limit the use of said trust fund to meet emer-
gencies for the Wallich family, that is, the blood 
relations of the \Vallich family. 
Thereafter, continuing on in said Paragraph 8, 
it provides : 
". . . said fund, and income therefrom, to be 
held and used by my said nephew until his 
death or for a period of 5 years after the date 
of my death, whichever shall first occur." 
Again, this demonstrates the intent of testator 
that there be a fund and the period during which 
the trustee should use said trust fund exclusively 
to meet emergencies for the Wallich family, which 
use is for a limited purpose for a limited period. 
Continuing on in said Will: 
" ... and upon the occurrence of such event, 
my said nephew, or in the event of h~s de~th 
prior to 5 years after my death, h1s wife, 
Loretta W allich, who shall act as successor 
trustee without bond, shall distribute any part 
of the trust fund that may be then on hand. to 
1ny heirs at law then living, upon the prm-
ciple of representations." 
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This portion of Paragraph 8 is very significant 
since it would be impossible for testator to more 
clearly express the fact that there was to be a trust 
fund to be administered since it provides for a suc-
cessor trustee, should said Fred W allich die and 
further provides that said succesor trustee should 
act without bond, signifying that otherwise there 
would be a trust fund requiring a bond of the trus-
tee; and then the most significant words of all, 
"shall distribute any part of trust fund that may 
then be on hand." How could the testator more 
clearly express his intention that there be a trust 
fund to be distributed than he did in using the words 
above written? 
Moreover, the parties who were to participate 
in said trust fund were defined and definitely fixed 
by the testator. 
The last Paragraph in Paragraph 8 of said 
Will provides: 
"My said nephew in the administration 
of the trust herein imposed upon him shall 
act with01lt the necessity of furnishing any 
bond or any other security, and without the 
necessity of making any accounting of any 
nature whatsoever to any person or party 
concerning the administration of his trust." 
Again, the phrase, "administration of the trust 
herein imposed upon him" is very significant and 
clearly shows testator's intention. 
See Mefford vs. LC1mkin 77 NE 960. 
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"Administration of estates implies such a 
complete disposition of them as to not only 
collect assets from, but to place them in the 
hands of creditors, legatees or to distribute 
them to whom after undergoing the process 
of administration they finally belong." 
"Of the estate herein imposed upon him" are 
the choicest words possible to indicate testator's in-
tention that Fred R. Wallich did have a trust im-
posed upon him and that it was a trust under which 
he would ordinarily be required to have a bond, 1 
as is signified by the use of the words, "shall act 
without the necessity of furnishing any bond or 
other security." Moreover, ''and without the neces-
sity of making an accounting of any nature what-
soever to any person or any party concerning the 
administration of this trust" indicates that the test-
ator intended that there was a fiduciary relation-
ship between Fred R. Wallich and the beneficiaries, 
which requires an accounting. See also the latter 
part of this brief wherein it is indicated that it is 
against public policy to attempt to relieve a trustee 
from the responsibility of an accounting. Most sig-
nificant is the fact that the Will did not relieve 
Fred R. Wallich from accounting "to the Court" 
which is the very issue now before this court. 
The nomenclature used in the case. at bar pecu-
liar to a creation of a trust and which demonstrates 
testator's intention to create a trust is as follows: 
1. The word "trust" is used once. 
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2. The words "to be held" is used twice. 
3. The word "used" is used three times. 
4. The word "discretion" is used once. 
5. The phrase "for the use and benefit of" 
is used once. 
6. "Administration of the trust herein im-
posed upon him" is used once. 
7. "Succesor trustee" is used once. 
8. "Act without bond" is used twice. 
9. "Trust fund" is used once. 
10. "Administration of his trust" is used 
once. 
11. "Accounting" is used once. 
In addition to the above, under his sworn state-
ment Fred Wallich filed with the court a receipt 
of distribution and an undertaking on distribution 
and upon his oath stated and represented to the 
court as follows: 
12. Used the terms "trustee under the will 
of Claudius W allich, deceased" twice. 
13. "To have, hold, administer and dispose 
of the same as pursuant to the provisions of Para-
graph 8 of the Last Will and Testament of Claudius 
W allich, deceased" once. 
14. "Under the provisions of the court order 
of the 24th day of February, 1959" once. 
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15. "To have, hold, administer and dispose of 
same as testamentary trustee and pursuant to the 
provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Last Will anq, 
Testament of said Claudius "\Vallich, deceased," is 
used once. 
Last, but not least and most significant is the 
following mandate from the Utah legislature: 
74-2-11 "Technical words in a will are to be 
taken in their technical sense, unles the con-
text clearly indicates a contrary intention." 
Under this statute the word "trust" is repugnant 
to an outright gift to the party and the other tech-
nical words make it very clear that a trust was in-
tended, and a gift to Fred Wallich was neither 
made nor intended. 
7 4-2-9 ''The words of a will are to receive an 
interpretation which will give to every ex-
pression some effect rather than one which 
will render any of the expressions inopera-
tive." 
If the words of the will a.re to be given some 
effect rather than to render the expression inoper-
ative, how can the appellant in good faith claim the 
fund as his own? 
Since words are to be taken in the technical 
sense and the petition and order used said words 
"pursuant to" the following cases define what the 
word "pursuant" means. 
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Brotherhood vs. Ralway Express 238 F 2d 181 
at 184: 
"As correctly held by the District Court, "pur-
suant' means 'in conformity to.' " 
First Central Trust vs. Claffin 73 NE 2d 238 
m a wills case the court held : 
"15 Pursuant is defined as 'agreeable to or 
in conformity with.' It means 'in a similar 
manner or by like methods.' '' 
POINT IV. 
7 4-2-1 U.C.A. 1953 A WILL IS TO BE CONSTRUED 
ACCORDING 'TO THE INTENTION OF 'THE TESTA-
TOR, WHERE HIS INTENTION CANNOT HAVE EF-
FECT TO ITS FULL EXTENT IT MUST HA VE EFFECT 
AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. 
While counsel for respondent takes the posi-
tion that the decree is final, and is not ambiguous, 
nevertheless should the court be inclined to construe 
the will, which is incorporated into the decree, coun-
sel invites the court's attention to the fact that the 
point above is copied word for word from the sta-
tute. 
In re: Dewey's Estate 143 P 124, 45 U 98. This 
is a leading case cited by the Supreme Court of 
Utah, in re: Efferson's Estate 259 P 920. It is also 
also quoted at great length in re: Davies' Estate 
56 P 2d 586, also in 41 NW 29 and many other 
cases as disclosed from Shephard's Citator. 
In Re: Dewey's Estate 
143 p 124 45 u 98 
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"I hereby give, devise and bequeath to the said 
Hubbard Tuttle, Sr. It is my desire that he 
shall distribute the same, or the proceeds 
thereof, among my nephews and nieces, and 
to such of them, and in such proportions, as 
he shall deem just and proper, and his decision 
upon such matters shall be final, conclusive 
and binding upon all parties." 
"* * * One rule, which we think may be said 
to be of universal application, is to the effect 
that no particular words are necessary to cre-
ate a trust, and that if from all the language 
used by the testator in his will, a trust is fair-
ly implied, the courts will enforce the same." 
"For technical language of course is not neces-
sary to create a trust. It is enough that the in-
tention is apparent." 
It is to be observed that the Dewey case had 
only one word in it that would indicate an intention 
to create a trust and that one word was "distribute." 
The word "trust" does not appear in said will. The 
Dewey case has many other significant citations 
from texts that show the length to which the court 
will go to carry out the intention of the testator. 
POINT V. 
ONE WHO SEEKS DISCHARGE OF A TESTA-
MENTARY TRUSTEE MUST ACCOUNT AND COM-
PLY WITH THE DECREE BEFORE ME CAN BE DIS-
CHARGED. 
Fred R. W allich invoked the jurisdiction of the 
lower court to be discharged as a testamentary 
trustee under 75-12-32 U.C.A., which statute he 
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plead. See Paragraph ( e) of his petition R 230. 
75-12-32 
"Agents, special administrators, trustee -
Final settlements, - section 75-12-19 and 75-
12-20 relating to final settlements shall apply 
to agents, special administrators and trustees, 
and to the estates administered by them." 
75-12-19 
"Discharge of personal representative. -
When the estate has been fully administered, 
and it is shown by the executor or adminis-
trator, by the production of satisfactory 
vouchers, that he has paid all sums of money 
due fr01n hi1n, and delivered under the order 
of the court all the property of the estate to 
the parties entitled, and perf onned all the 
acts lawfully required of him, the court must 
make a judgment or decree discharging him 
from all liability to be incurred thereafter." 
Emphasis supplied. 
Bearing in mind the fact that the law govern-
ing the final discharge of executors and administra-
tors is applicable to trustees by statute, the follow-
ing Utah cases show that Fred R. Wallich must ac-
count to the court, produce vouchers and distribute 
the residue as provided for under the said trust in 
order to receive his discharge. This is what the lower 
court has ordered since it is mandatory under the 
statute. 
In re: Brooks Estate 30 P 2d 1065 83 U 506 
~~The duties of an administrator are not fully 
performed until he has not only accounted for 
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but distributed as ordered by the court all 
of the assets of the estate ... " 
Ehrngren vs. Grolund 57 P at 269 190 U 411: 
"The executor could not obtain his discharge 
so as to release the sureties on the bond until 
he has complied with the decree." 
Moreover, in the case at bar, the court in its 
order of September 24, 1959, with respect to the 
residue ordered appellant: 
"* * * to be held and used by him in accord-
ance with and pursuant to the provisions of 
Paragraph 8 of the Will." 
In the Ehrngren case supra the court held: 
"The executor was ordered by the court to 
deposit this money as executor. The decree 
was directed to the executor officially. The 
decree being conclusive, and the court having 
directed the executor what to do with the 
fund in the execution of his duty under the 
law, such order and decree must be complied 
with, before the executor would be entitled 
to his discharge from the obligation imposed 
by the statute. His obligation, therefore, was 
not ended, and the liability of his sureties was 
not cancelled, until he had complied with the 
order of the court, and deposited the bequest 
as directed." Emphasis supplied. 
The legislature of Utah has made it manda-
tory for a trustee not only to account but also to 
produce vouchers or receipts. Even in states where 
it is not mandatory under the statute to account, 
the common law places the burden of proof on a 
trustee to account and settle. 
24 
In Georgia Code 113-2207 subs 6, 7 provides: 
"A testator may by will dispense with the 
necessity of inventory or returns, provided 
there is no injury to creditors or third per-
sons." 
Utah has no such statute, yet the Georgia court 
in Chapalas vs. Papachristos 195 S.E. 739 where the 
testator in his will under Item 5 provided: 
"I relieve him from making any inventory of 
my property or appraisement, or from giving 
any bond, and he is required only by his will 
to probate and see that its terms are carried 
out, and he is further relieved from making 
any returns of his acts and doings to any 
court whatever. Held, that this item of the 
will did not render the execiitor unanswerable 
in court in a proceeding by legatee for an ac-
counting and settlement * * *" Emphasis 
supplied. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Walker vs. 
Walker 404 P 2d 253 17 U 2d 53 cites Wood vs. 
Honeyman 169 P 2d 131, 171 ALR 587. The Wood 
case held: 
"19. We are completely satisfied that no 
trust instrument can relieve a trustee from 
his duty to account in a court of equity." 
The court in the preceding paragraph in the 
Wood case, to support its ruling quotes the follow-
mg: 
"Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, S 972 says: 
A settlor who attempts to create a trust 
without court accountability in the trustee is 
contradicting himself. A trust necessarily 
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means rights in the cestui, enforcible in 
equity. If the trustee cannot be called to ac-
count, the cestui cannot force the trustee to 
any particular line of conduct with regard to 
the trust property or sue for breach of trust. 
The trustee may do as he likes with the pro-
perty, and the cestui is without remedy. If 
the court finds that the settlor really intend-
ed a trust, it would seem that accountability 
in chancery or other court niiist inevitably f al-
low as an incident. Without an account the 
cestui must be in the dark as to whether there 
has been a breach of trust and so is prevented 
as a practical matter from holding the trus-
tee liable for a breach." 
Still quoting the court in the Wood case, the fol-
lowing is taken from Scott on Trusts, § 172: 
"Thus it has been held that a provision in a 
will that the executors and trustees named 
therein should not be obliged to file with the 
surrogate any inventory is against public 
policy, since to give effect to the provision 
would remove the barriers designed to pro-
tect estates from misappropriations. Similarly 
it has been held that where a husband trans-
ferred property to his wife in trust for the 
support of their children, and provided that 
she should not be required to account for the 
expenditure of the property, the children can 
maintain a suit against their mother to com-
pel an accounting." 
We quote once more from Bogert on Trusts 
and Trustees, § 972 : 
"If the settlor tries to reduce the accounting 
duty of the trustee, either by providing that 
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the common-law duty shall be diminished or 
by stipulating that it shall not be necessary 
for his trustee to obey a duty to account ex-
presed in statutory form, it would seem that 
the effort should be invalid and the duty of 
the trustee unaffected. The settlor ought not 
to be able to oust the court of its constitution-
al or statutory jurisdiction, or to override the 
acts of the legislature concerning information 
to be furnished by trustees to their benefici-
aries. Provisions of this sort in deeds or wills 
would seem against public policy and void, 
just as contract clauses to like effect are de-
clared null." Emphasis supplied: 
171 A.L.R. 631 This annotation cites other 
cases holding that it is against public policy to re-
lieve a trustee from making an account. Moreover, 
the will of testator did not relieve testator from 
accounting to the court. 
POINT VI. 
THE INTENTION OF THE TESTATOR MUST BE 
ASCERTAINED FROM THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE 
WILL. 
Appellant has nowhere in its brief demonstrat-
ed that Paragraph 8 is in any way ambiguous. The 
point above is a direct quote from Auerbach vs. 
Samuels, 342 P 2d 879, also 95 C.J.S. Wills § 591. 
Also In Re: Baum's Estate 
294 p 2d 711 
4 u 2d 375 
"Elementary in the law of wills is that the 
intention of the testator must govern. To ar-
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rive at that intention courts must consider 
the will in its entirety and not merely the 
particular clauses which are in dispute." 
In considering the four corners of the Will, 
it will be observed that in Paragraph 7 of said Will, 
which immediately precedes Paragraph 8, or the one 
here under consideration, that the testator was very 
articulate and was not lacking in words to express 
his intention that with respect to the trust fund held 
by A. C. Wallich under Paragraph 7, that A. C. 
W allich should have the same as his sole, separate 
property free of the trust, and said Paragraph 7 in 
part provides : 
"If any part of said money or if said pro-
perty still remain in the trust, then he, the 
said A. C. Wallich, shall have such remainder 
of said property held by him in trust as afore-
said as his sole separate property free of the 
trust herein imposed." Emphasis supplied. 
Appellant now represents to this court that after 
having drafted Paragraph 7 that the testator sud-
denly became inarticulate in the drafting of Para-
graph 8 and unable to express his intention. 
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Extrinsic Evidence 
All evidence attempted to be introduced by ap-
pellant in the lower court was inadmissable. 57 
Am. Jur. 684, § 1053: 
"Conversely, where the will expressly creates 
a trust, extrinsic evidence is not cmnpeten t to 
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show the testator's intention to bequeath a 
beneficial interest to the one named trustee." 
In Re: Baum's Estate 294 P 2d 711 ____ U ----: 
"4, 5 The rule that extrinsic evidence can-
not be resorted to to dispute the testator's 
recitals is not obviated by section 75-12-9, 
UCA 1953 relied upon by petitioners ... " 
57 Am. Jur. 708, § 1107: 
"Memoranda made by the testator at the time 
of the execution of his will, and used by him 
as the basis for its preparation, have, how-
ever, been held inadmissible to show that by 
the word "surplus" in the residuary clause 
the testator intended to include his real estate 
as well as his personality." 
Mahoney vs. Grainger 186 NE 87: 
"(2-6) A will duly executed and allowed by 
the court must under the statute of wills 
(G. L. Ter. Ed. c. 191, § 1 et seq.) be accept-
ed as the final expression of the intent of the 
person executing it. The fact that it was not 
in conformity to the instructions given to the 
draftsman who prepared it or that he made a 
mistake does not authorize a court to reform 
or alter it or remould it by amendments. The 
will must be construed as it came from the 
hands of the testatrix." 
95 C.J.S. 927, § 638: 
"Testimony of the attorney who drew or ad-
vised the drawing of the will, the scrivener 
who wrote it, or of the attesting witness to 
the testator's signature, as to his understand-
ing of what the testator intended by the terms 
of his will is inadmissible." 
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Last and most significant is the citation 94 
ALR commencing at Page 1, with most significant 
annotations at Page 257 through 291. All annota-
tions from 257 to 291 directly show all evidence 
submited by appellant is inadmissable; however, 
if counsel would include all citations in this brief, 
it would exceed the 50-page limitation since there 
are over 34 pages of small print in that one portion 
of said annotation alone. 
POINT VII. 
FRED R. WALLICH rs ESTOPPED FROM ASSERT-
ING THAT THERE IS NO TRUST AND THAT THE 
RESIDUE WAS A GIFT TO HIM PERSONALLY. 
Said Fred R. W allich should be estopped from 
asserting that there is no trust and that all the 
residue is his sole, separate property under Para-
graph 8 of said will for the following reasons: 
1. Fred R. Wallich stipulated that an order 
be entered that the residue and remainder be dis-
tributed as set forth in said petition and said peti-
tion provided that it be distributed to Fred R. Wal-
lich "to be held and used by him in his discretion 
in accordance with and· pursuant to the provisions 
of Paragraph 8 of the will of the deceased." 
2. The order of February 24, 1959 was en-
tered distributing the property to Fred R. W allich, 
''to be held and used by him in his discretion in 
accordance with and pursuant to the provisions of 
Paragraph 8 of the will of the deceased." Fred R. 
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W allich did not request that the court construe the 
will and did not appeal from said order, which order 
: was exactly as he stipulated it to be. 
3. Fred R. W allich did sign and deliver and 
file in court- R 199 - a sworn statement acknowl-
edging receipt from the executor said residue "Fred 
R. Wallich, trustee u/w Claudius Wallich, deceased 
under the provisions of the order of the above-en-
titled court made and entered on the 24th day of 
February, 1959, to hold, administer and dispose of 
same as testamentary trustee and pursuant to the 
provisions of Paragraph 8 of the Last Will and 
Testament of Claudius Wallich, deceased." and sign-
ed a second receipt and filed the same with the 
court, R 201, in similar words and figures. These 
two receipts demonstrate that said Fred R. W allich 
recognized that Paragraph 8 had been incorporated 
into the court order and that he was therefore com-
plying with the court order in accepting said pro-
perty in trust and he is estopped from asserting 
otherwise. 
4. At R 158 Fred R. Wallich under his veri-
fied petition represented to the court that he re-
ceived the residue as a testamentary trustee and in-
tended to carry out said trust and that because said 
stock certificates contained the language: 
'"Trustee u/w Claudius Walich, deceased" that 
he could not transfer any stock to pay for or carry 
out the trust responsibilits under said will. 
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R 158, the court made a finding that he made 
such a representation declaring that he received 
the property and that he represented to the court 
that he would carry out the terms of the will which 
he recognized had been incorporated in the court 
order, and he should be estopped from asserting 
otherwise. 
5. Fred R. Wallich represented to the District 
Court, in this very case, but involving Paragraph 
7 of the Will, that he was a testamentary trustee of 
the residue of this estate and that he could be called 
upon by the beneficiaries to distribute to them under 
said residuary trust R 357 and when they called 
upon him in California, he claimed there was no 
trust. See also R 95 where under his sworn state-
ment Fred R. Wallich and his counsel represented 
to the Court that there was $150,000.00 in this very 
residuary trust they now deny. And he also made 
representation to this Supreme Court that he was 
"trustee of the residuary estated under the will of 
Claudius Wallich, deceased." See exhibit attached to 
the front page of this brief. The beneficiaries relied 
upon such representations and Fred R. Wallich 
should be estopped to now claim or contend that he 
is not a trustee of said residue. 
6. Since the beneficiaries under said trust pur-
sued their remedy in California as they had to since 
they could not obtain jurisdiction of said Fred R. 
Wallich in Utah, he again represented to the Calif-
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ornia court that he was a testamentary trustee and 
as such should be entitled to conclude the matter in 
' Utah on a petition he filed in Utah after action 
had been commenced against him in California. See 
R 291. He should, therefore, be estopped from assert-
ing that he is not a testamentary trustee. 
7. · In the very petition which he filed seek-
ing his discharge as testamentary trustee and now 
before this court, he asserts that he is a testamen-
tary trustee and seeks discharge under a statute 
providing for the discharge of testamentary trus-
tees. See R 230. Such an assertion, in and of itself, 
is so repugnant and incompatible with the holding 
of both the legal and the equitable title in himself as 
to be offensive to the administration of justice and 
he should be estopped to assert he is not a testa-
mentary trustee based on said petition for this 
reason alone. 
Although the lower Court had ordered Fred 
R. W alich to account, before taking further action, 
respondents were obliged to determine whether he 
would comply with such order or appeal therefrom. 
After Fred R. W alich appealed from said order re-
spondents filed a verified petition asserting that 
counsel for Fred R. W allich claimed that Fred R. 
Wallich had lost $30,000.00 in the sale and transfer 
of said Crown Zellerbach stock; and respondents al-
leged that Fred R. W allich was irresponsible wast-
ing the assets of the trust estate and converting the 
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same to his own use, that all his acts were in deroga-
tion of said trust and that said Fred R. W allich 
should be required to account for $205,000.00 and 
in such accounting he should not be allowed any 
credit for any of said claimed loss, attorneys fees, 
or other expenses. R 355 A. 
Respondents in support of said petition filed 
a memorandum of authorities which is on file be-
fore this Court. R 329. 
Counsel for appellants refused to permit the 
lower Court to hear said matter based upon a motion 
that said Court was shorn of jurisdiction by reason 
of this appeal. Considering all the circumstances 
including the admonition of the California Court 
that: 
"If the Utah procedings are conducted in 
good faith and with due diligence," 
also the fact that the beneficiaries have already been 
compelled to retain counsel in Detroit, Los Angeles, 
and Salt Lake City, after invoking equity juridsic-
tion, the refusal of Fred R. Wallich to permit equity 
to do complete justice obviously demonstrates his 
intention not to conduct the Utah proceding in good 
faith and with due diligence, and to the contrary 
could well be considered by this Court as an attempt 
on his part to obstruct the administration of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, respondents pray that this 
Court affirm the order of the lower Court in such 
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manner as will impress appellant that Courts ex-
pect a fiduciary to realize the dignity and respon-
sibility of his position and to conduct himself 
accordingly. Counsel respectfully suggests that 
such affirmation will have the effect of preventing 
matters pertaining to the Wallich estate from be-
coming a perennial problem before the lower Court 
the California Court and this Court; and will not 
only aid in the administration of justice but save 
needless expense and attorney's fees for the many 
beneficiaries under said trust. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK & SCHOENHALS 
E. L. SCHOENHALS 
A tiorneys for Cross-Petitioner 
and Respondents 
903 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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